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NOTES
THE SECOND AMENDMENT: A STUDY OF RECENT TRENDS
I. INTRODUCTION
The second amendment of the Constitution of the United States reads:
"A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state,
the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed."1
The interpretation of these twenty-seven words has generated considera-
ble debate since they were first declared in force in 1791.2 Despite a grow-
ing argument over the true meaning of the amendment, the Supreme
Court has been reluctant to provide a definitive interpretation of the sec-
ond amendment and thus give it the recognition it merits.
Presently, the United States is trapped between its noble and historic
notions of individuals' rights and the grim reality of an age of unprece-
dented civil 'violence. Patrick Henry once stated, "[t]he great object is
that every man be armed .... Every one who is able may have a gun."'3
This sentiment is understandable and admirable. Now, however, many
Americans wish that the founding fathers had placed a little more em-
phasis in the second amendment on the kind of individuals who could
own firearms and less on the simple ability of an individual to have a gun.
The right to possess a gun that was established by the second amendment
has been exercised for centuries by countless Americans. Although the
exact number of guns currently existing in the United States is unknown,
it has been estimated that there is more than one gun for every two
people.4
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. II. The capitalization and punctuation of the second amendment
are not consistently reported. See Hardy, The Second Amendment and the Historiography
of the Bill of Rights, 4 J.L. & POL. 1, n.1 (1987).
2. SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, THE RIGHT
TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS, S. REP. No. 522-3, 97th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1 (1982) [hereinafter
REPORT]. "There is probably less agreement, more misinformation, and less understanding
of the right to keep and bear arms than any other current controversial constitutional is-
sue." Id. at 28 (quoting AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, Background Report on Firearms
Control).
3. REPORT, supra note 2, at v.
4. Lock and Load for the Gunfight of '89, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REP., Mar. 27, 1989 at 9.
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On March 28, 1991, the tenth anniversary of his shooting by John W.
Hinckley, Jr., former President Ronald Reagan expressed his support for
the Brady Bill,5 a federal law requiring a seven-day waiting period for
handgun purchases.' This shift by Reagan, a member of the National
Rifle Association ("NRA") who generally followed the NRA's views, is
seen as a major victory for the proponents of gun control.,
Both Congress and the state legislatures have been slowly moving to-
ward controlling gun ownership in the United States and the courts have
virtually side-stepped the issue. It is hoped that Reagan's support will be
the catalyst necessary to bring about some significant changes in this area
of gun control."
The purpose of this note is not to give an in depth history of the second
amendment and the intent of its drafters.9 Rather, this note will give an
overview of how the Supreme Court has interpreted the amendment. This
note will then examine the recent trend towards restricting the individ-
ual's right to own certain firearms that has been taking place in both the
courts and the legislatures.
II. THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS: INDIVIDUAL OR COLLECTIVE?
A deeply polarized debate as to whether the second amendment pro-
vides individuals, as opposed to the people as a whole, the right to bear
arms has long existed. Many state constitutions, as well as the federal
constitution, recognize that the people have some right to bear arms.10 It
is the interpretation of the extent of this right which has caused the de-
bate to become so hotly contested. Therefore, before one may effectively
analyze the judicial interpretations of the second amendment, it is neces-
sary to understand the difference between the opposing philosophies.
5. See infra note 108.
6. The New York Times, March 29, 1991, at Al, col. 1.
7. Id. at All.
8. Id.
9. For several good studies that do provide such an in depth history, see Bordenet, The
Right to Possess Arms: The Intent of the Framers of the Second Amendment, 21 U. WEST
L.A. L. REV. 1 (1990); Caplan, The Right of the Individual to Bear Arms: A Recent Judicial
Trend, 1982 DET. C.L. REV. 789 (1982); Hardy, supra note 1; Moncure, Who is the Militia-
The Virginia Ratification Convention and the Right to Bear Arms, 19 LINCOLN L. REV. 1
(1990).
10. For example, VA. CONsT. art. I, 13 reads:
[t]hat a well regulated militia, composed of the body of the people, trained to arms, is
the proper, natural, and safe defense of a free state, therefore, the right of the people
to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; that standing armies, in time of peace,
should be avoided as dangerous to liberty; and that in all cases the military should be
under strict subordination to, and governed by, the civil power.




A. The Individual Rights Theory
Those who support the theory of individual rights focus almost exclu-
sively on the second amendment's latter part, which reads "the right of
the people to keep and bear arms, shall not be infringed."11 Indeed, pro-
gun groups such as the NRA which are very supportive of the individual
rights theory, are content to completely ignore the previous part of the
amendment. 12
Individual rights proponents regard the reference to the militia in the
second amendment as nothing more than a justification for the individual
right. Indeed, they emphasize that the second amendment was adopted in
an era when all able bodied men were required by state law to furnish
their own arms.' 3 This calls into question the original intent of the draft-
ers of the document. Often, the following passage from James Madison,
the drafter of the second amendment, is offered as evidence of his intent:
"[T]he advantage of being armed . . . the Americans possess over the
people of all other nations. . . . Notwithstanding the military establish-
ments in the several Kingdoms of Europe, which are carried as far as the
public resources will bear, the governments are afraid to trust the people
with arms.' 4 Although this statement seems to support the idea that the
right to bear arms was intended to be exercised by the people, it does not
suggest that the term "the people" is to be interpreted as individuals,
rather than as the collective society.
An early commentator, publishing in 1825, noted that under the second
amendment:
The prohibition is general. No clause in the Constitution could by a rule of
construction be conceived to give to Congress a power to disarm the people.
Such a flagitious attempt could only be made under some general pretense
by a state legislature. But if in blind pursuit of inordinate power, either
should attempt it, this amendment may be appealed to as a restraint on
both. 5
The second amendment does not specify whether it is the federal govern-
ment or the state governments, or both which are prohibited from in-
fringing on the right of the people to bear arms. A staunch supporter of
the individual rights theory would undoubtedly argue that neither the
11. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
12. The National Rifle Association ("NRA"), founded in 1871, has about three million
members and an operating budget of 86 million dollars. Above their headquarters in Wash-
ington, D.C. are these words: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed." King, Sarah and James Brady; Target: The Gun Lobby, N.Y. Times, Dec. 9,
1990, § 6, at 82, col. 2-3.
13. Bordenet, supra note 9, at 22.
14. REPORT, supra note 2, at v (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 26 (J. Madison)).
15. REPORT, supra note 2, at vii (quoting RAWLE, "VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION" (1825)).
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state nor the federal government may infringe on the right. Under this
view, however, a logical conclusion would be that an individual has a right
to own machine guns, missiles or whatever "arms" he or she wishes to
possess. The result could be not one standing army, but countless stand-
ing armies; this could not have been the intent of the drafters.
Although the Supreme Court has never definitively stated whether the
right to bear arms is individual or collective, case law strongly indicates
that the Court favors the notion of a collective right. This is not to say
that all courts have followed such an interpretation of the second amend-
ment. Indeed "no fewer than twenty-one decisions by the courts of our
states have recognized an individual right to keep and bear arms, and a
majority of these have not only recognized the right but invalidated laws
or regulations which abridged it.""' Furthermore, at least one federal ap-
pellate court has agreed that the second amendment stands for the indi-
vidual's right to keep and bear arms.17
Needless to say, the debate over the right of the states to place reason-
able limitations on the individual's right to bear arms continues to this
day. It now appears however, that courts are starting to accept the notion
that states can place certain limitations on the rights of individuals to
make, own and use certain weapons. The American Civil Liberties Union
explains its interpretation of the Court's position in its Policy No. 43:
The Union agrees with the Supreme Court's long-standing interpretation of
the Second Amendment that the individual's right to keep and bear arms
applies only to the preservation or efficiency of a "well-regulated militia."
Except for lawful police and military purposes, the possession of weapons
by individuals is not constitutionally protected."8
Despite the fact that courts have recognized some form of gun regulation
as constitutionally permissible, many people contend that "[d]raconian
gun control measures, such as a total ban on the private possession of
firearms, would . . . be unconstitutional.' 19
Those in favor of a collective rights interpretation argue that the "right
of the people," in the second amendment refers to a right of society as a
whole. A potent argument against this interpretation however, is that the
same words are used in the first and fourth amendmentss ° and are univer-
16. Id. at vi.
17. Bordenet, supra note 9, at 27; Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916 (1st Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943). The court in Cases was determining whether a .38 caliber
Colt type revolver could have a reasonable relationship to the preservation and efficiency of
a well-regulated militia. The court stated that the federal government could only prohibit
weapons without such a relationship. Cases, 319 U.S. at 922-23.
18. REPORT, supra note 2, at 28 (quoting American Civil Liberties Union Policy No. 43).
19. Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty, and the Right to Self-Preserva-
tion, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 122 (1987).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. I & IV. The first amendment deals with the right of free speech
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sally accepted as suggesting an individual right. Since the second amend-
ment is sandwiched between the first and the fourth Amendments and all
three were drafted by the same man, one could easily derive the conclu-
sion that the words were intended to have a uniform meaning in all three.
B. The Collective Rights Theory
Proponents of the collective rights interpretation of the second amend-
ment strongly emphasize its first part, which states "a well regulated mili-
tia, being necessary to the security of a free state."' The basis of the
collective rights theory is that the individual possesses the right to bear
arms because he is an integral part of a free state's security.22 "The col-
lective rights theory of the right to bear arms was born in the 1905 deci-
sion of the Kansas Supreme Court in Salina v. Blaksley."23 In Salina, the
court explained that the relevant section of the Bill of Rights of Kansas
referring to the right of the people "'to bear arms for their defense and
security' refers to the people as a collective body."'24
Although the United States Supreme Court has never used such defini-
tive language, an analysis of the cases reveals that the Court has virtually
always felt that the right to bear arms is strongly tied to the security of a
free state, and therefore, is of a'collective nature.
III. SECOND AMENDMENT CASES BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT
The federal government did not start to regulate firearms until Con-
gress passed the National Firearms Act in 1934.25 Before this, the Su-
preme Court had few opportunities to interpret the second amendment.
In fact, the second amendment's entire history before the Court can be
gleaned from a handful of cases. This is surprising considering that the
meaning of the second amendment is not intrinsically clear.26 Given its
and the fourth amendment prohibits wrongful search and seizure.
21. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
22. I have used the word "he" intentionally because it suggests a problem with the collec-
tive rights theory. If individuals are permitted to own "arms" solely because they are mem-
bers of the militia, the question remains if this suggests that the right can only be exercised
by men. The militia and reserve militia have traditionally been comprised of men. Women,
however, are also members now if they are United States citizens and commissioned officers
in the National Guard. See 10 U.S.C. § 311(a) (1988).
23. Caplan, sup)ra note 9, at 823 (discussing Salina v. BIaksley, 72 Kan. 230, 83 P. 619
(1905)).
24. Salina v. Blaksley, 72 Kan. 230, 231, 83 P. 619, 620 (1905).
25. National Firearms Act, ch. 757, 48 Stat. 1236 (1934) (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C.A. §§ 5801-72 (West 1989) (this act established a tax on certain transactions involving
specified firearms and restricted the importation and interstate transportation of such
weapons).
26. See, Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 644 (1989).
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unclear meaning, one would have expected that the Court would have
seized some opportunity to provide an unambiguous interpretation of the
exact bounds of the right to bear arms.
In Dred Scott v. Sanford,2" the Court indirectly indicated that the right
to bear arms is an individual right. In Dred Scott, the Court held that
African-Americans were not citizens of the United States and the respec-
tive states could not make them citizens. In rationalizing its decision, the
Court described the rights of American citizens that would have had to be
given to African-Americans if the Court held otherwise. The Court stated
that such a decision:
would give to persons of the negro race, who are recogni[z]ed as citizens in
any one state . . . the right to enter every other [s]tate, whenever they
pleased. . . full liberty of speech in public and in private upon all subjects
upon which its own citizens might speak; to hold public meetings upon po-
litical affairs, and to keep and carry arms wherever they went.28
This language suggests that the right to keep and bear arms is an individ-
ual right that travels with each citizen wherever he or she may go. Such a
right is ostensibly unrelated to a "well regulated militia."
The first case in which the Supreme Court dealt more directly with the
second amendment was United States v. Cruikshank,29 which involved
two African-American men who had their firearms seized by a large group
of Klansmen in Louisiana. Several of these Klansmen were convicted of
crimes including conspiracy to deprive African-Americans of their consti-
tutional right to keep and bear arms. Although this was essentially a civil
rights case, the Court did rule on the right of individuals to bear arms.
The Court stated that the limitations found in the second amendment
serve only to restrict the powers of the federal government and are not
applicable to state governments.3 0 Since the Constitution established no
individual right to bear arms, the right could not have been violated."1 In
short, regarding the right of bearing arms for a lawful purpose, the Court
noted that:
[T]his is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any man-
ner dependent upon that instrument for its existence. The Second Amend-
ment declares that it shall not be infringed; but this, as has been seen,
means no more than that it shall not be infringed by Congress.3 2
A decade later, the Supreme Court heard Presser v. Illinois,33 which
27. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. 393 (1856).
28. Id. at 417 (emphasis adaed).
29. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
30. Id. at 553.
31. See id.
32. Id.
33. 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
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involved a defendant who led a parade of several hundred armed men
through Chicago, without a license. The intent of the group was to intimi-
date various groups of immigrants. When charged with parading without
a permit, the defendant claimed that he was protected under the second
amendment. The Court reaffirmed the position it had taken in Cruik-
shank, and explained that the right to bear arms is not an individual
right granted by the Constitution.34 The Court continued:
It is undoubtedly true that all citizens capable of bearing arms constitute
.the reserved military force or reserve militia of the United States as well as
of the [s]tates, and, in view of this prerogative of the general government, as
well as of its general powers, the [s]tates cannot, even laying the constitu-
tional provision in question out of view, prohibit the people from keeping
and bearing arms, so as to deprive the United States of their rightful re-
source for maintaining the public security, and disable the people from
performing their duty to the general government.35
The above passage suggests that a state may not disarm its citizens.3 6 It
is important to note however, that this is not because the citizens have an
individual right to bear arms. Rather it is because they belong to the fed-
eral militia and the states are prohibited from disarming the federal
militia.
Perhaps the least significant second amendment case is Miller v.
Texas,3 7 in which a convicted murderer asserted that the state of Texas
had violated his second, fourth, fifth and fourteenth amendment rights.38
In unanimously dismissing his claim, the Court again stated that the sec-
ond amendment did not apply to state action.39
Perhaps the most significant of the second amendment cases is United
States v. Miller.'0 Miller and a friend were charged under section 11 of
the 1934 National Firearms Act with carrying a double-barrelled, sawed-
34. Id. at 265.
35. Id. (emphasis added). It is interesting to note that even today all able-bodied men 17
to 44 are members of the unorganized militia. 10 U.S.C.A. § 311 (West 1983).
36. The sentence after the quotation reads: "But, as already stated, we think it clear that
the sections under consideration do not have this effect." Id. at 265-66. It is curious that the
Court would establish a limitation on the states' rights to disarm its citizens, outside of the
Constitution, and then proceed to explain that the sections of the Constitution do not have
this effect anyway.
37. 153 U.S. 535 (1894).
38. Miller was convicted of murder on July 23, 1892. He then appealed to the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas, the court of last resort in criminal cases, where the judgment
was affirmed. After a motion for rehearing was denied, the defendant executed a writ and
challenged the Texas statute prohibiting a person from carrying a dangerous weapon. It was
by authority of this statute that the court instructed the jury that if the defendant was on
the street carrying a pistol, he was violating the law. Id.
39. Id. at 538.
40. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
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off, twelve gauge shotgun across state lines from Oklahoma to Arkansas.41
The district court held that section eleven of the National Firearms Act
violated the second amendment and thus quashed the indictment.,2 Al-
though the state of Texas appealed the decision directly to the Supreme
Court, the defendants failed to appear and did not file a brief before the
Court.
United States v. Miller is of particular importance not only because it
is the only second amendment case decided in this century, but also be-
cause it is also the only case decided by the Supreme Court in which it
actually interprets the second amendment. 3 The Court ruled that:
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a
"shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this time
has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well
regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees
the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within
judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equip-
ment or that its use could contribute to the common defense. 4
Commentators have demonstrated that this holding is insignificant stand-
ing alone, because sawed off and short barreled shotguns are actually
commonly used as military weapons.45 Nonetheless, Miller does suggest
that a new approach is to be used in determining which firearms are to be
protected by the second amendment.46
The Miller Court accepted the plain meaning of "militia" as
comprised [of] all males physically capable of acting in concert for the com-
mon defense. "A body of citizens enrolled for military discipline." And fur-
ther, that ordinarily when called for service these men were expected to ap-
pear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the kind in common use at
the time.17
Significantly, the Court held for a particular firearm to warrant the pro-
tection of the second amendment, the firearm must have some reasonable
relationship to a well regulated militia.4" This holding can be viewed as a
41. Id. at 175.
42. Id. at 177.
43. See Lund, supra note 19, at 109.
44. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178 (emphasis added).
45. See Lund, supra note 19, at 109.
46. See REPORT, supra note 2, at 92; Note, Assault Rifle Legislation: Unwise and Uncon-
stitutional, 17 AM. J. CRIM. LAW. 143, 169 (1989).
47. 307 U.S. at 179. The last part of the statement is interesting because it suggests that
the Court anticipated (or at least was aware of the potential for) advancements in weaponry.
A literal interpretation would support the idea that individuals today should be permitted
to keep and bear any weapons that would be of use to the militia. Fortunately, this interpre-
tation is not at issue.
48. Id. at 178.
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logical compromise between the individual rights theory and the collec-
tive rights theory. The Court recognized the right of individuals to pos-
sess firearms, but created the limitation that the firearms must serve the
collective purpose. One can only guess if this holding would have differed
had the defendants presented their side of the argument.
Over thirty years after the Miller decision, the Supreme Court revisited
the second amendment and the Miller case in Adams v. Williams.49
While discussing complications arising from search and seizure, Justice
Douglas wrote in his dissent:
A powerful lobby dins into the ears of our citizenry that these gun
purchases are constitutional rights protected by the Second Amendment...
There is under our decisions no reason why stiff state laws governing the
purchase and possession of pistols may not be enacted. There is no reason
why pistols may not be barred from anyone with a police record. There is no
reason why a State may not require a purchaser of a pistol to pass a psychi-
atric test. There is no reason why all pistols should not be barred to every-
one except the police.5"
There is little danger that one might misinterpret the words of Justice
Douglas. He indicated quite clearly that the right to keep and bear arms
is collective in nature and is designed to support the militia. Even more
clear is his strong belief that since this right is collective, a state can regu-
late the extent to which its citizens can exercise it.
Finally, in Lewis v. United States,51 the Court upheld the 1968 Gun
Control Act and stated in a telling footnote, "[t]hese legislative restric-
tions on the use of firearms are neither based upon constitutionally sus-
pect criteria, nor do they trench upon any constitutionally protected lib-
erties." 2 The Court cited Miller as support for this conclusion." Thus, as
recently as 1980, the Supreme Court has indicated that the Miller re-
quirement, that firearms have some reasonable relationship to the preser-
vation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, is still in effect, therefore
making the right to keep and bear arms a collective right that is subject
to regulation.
49. 407 U.S. 143 (1972).
50. Id. at 150 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Douglas then quoted from Miller:
The Militia which the States were expected to maintain and train is set in contrast
with Troops which they were forbidden to keep without the consent of Congress. The'
sentiment of the time strongly disfavored standing armies; the common view was that
adequate defense of country and laws could be secured through the Militia-civilians
primarily, soldiers on occasion.
Id. at 150-51 (quoting Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178-79).
51. 445 U.S. 95 (1980).
52. Id. at 65, n. 8.
53. Id.
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IV. RECENT COURTS OF APPEALS DECISIONS
The two most notable recent courts of appeals decisions concerning this
issue are Quilici v. The Village of Morton Grove,5 and Farmer v. Hig-
gins.5  Quilici involved a challenge to a local ordinance banning hand-
guns. On June 8, 1981, the Chicago suburb of Morton Grove, Illinois
banned handguns.5 6 There were exclusions in the ordinance providing
that police officers, jail and prison authorities, members of the armed
forces and licensed gun collectors and gun clubs could possess and use
handguns.57 Both the Illinois Supreme Court and the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the ordinance was a proper exercise of Morton
Grove's police power.58 Although the case was appealed to the Supreme
Court, it declined to hear the case and thus allowed the lower court's
decision to stand .5 The decision of the Seventh Circuit stated that there
is no individual right to keep and bear arms under the second amend-
ment." This then, would appear to be yet another nail in the coffin of the
'individual rights' interpretation of the second amendment.
Most recent was the case of Farmer v. Higgins.6 1 The case has been
called- the "first ban on firearms possession by law-abiding citizens in
American history."62 Farmer was a gun collector who applied to the Bu-
reau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF") in October of 1986 for
permission to legally make and register a machine gun for his personal
collection.6 3 The ATF denied Farmer's application in February of 1987 on
the ground that the Firearms Owners' Protection Act of 1986 prohibits
54. 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
55. 907 F.2d 1041 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 753 (1991).
56. See Quilici v. Village of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169, 1171 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
57. 695 F.2d at 263-64, n.1. It was proposed that the city of Richmond adopt a similar
ordinance. The law would make it illegal for residents of public housing to own guns. See
Potter, Panel Lays Way for Compromise on Gun Ban, Richmond News Leader, Jan. 31,
1991, at 13, col. 1.
58. 695 F.2d at 269.
59. 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
60. 695 F.2d at 270.
61. 907 F.2d 1041 (11th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 753 (1991).
62. See Isikoff & Markus, Justices Decline to Consider Challenge to U.S. Machine Gun
Ban, Wash. Post, Jan. 15, 1991, at A3; see also A Right to Machine Guns?, Wash. Post, Jan.
15, 1991, at A20, where it is stated:
The Supreme Court in the past has found no constitutional bar to legislation requir-
ing the registration of handguns or prohibiting the sale of firearms to .convicted
felons, the mentally incapacitated and other groups thought to be especially danger-
ous when armed. But when Congress prohibited future private ownership of machine
guns in 1986, the National Rifle Association thought it had a stronger case to bring
before the justices. That law, says the NRA, is the first ban in American history on
firearms possession by law-abiding citizens, and because it is such a sweeping restric-
tion, it violates the Second Amendment. Yesterday the Supreme Court declined to
consider that argument.
63. 907 F.2d at 1042.
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the making and manufacture of new machine guns for possession by pri-
vate individuals.6 4 Farmer then filed an action for a declaratory judgment
and for a writ of mandamus. 5 Whereupon, "a U.S. District Court judge in
Georgia initially emasculated the law by giving its plain meaning a tor-
tured interpretation" 6 and then ordered the Bureau to process Farmer's
application or issue the requested permit.6
7
Upon appeal to the Eleventh Circuit the sole issue in Farmer was
whether title 18 U.S.C.A § 922(o) of the United States Code prohibits the
private possession of machine guns not lawfully possessed prior to May
19, 1986. s The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision and
held that section 922(o) does prohibit such possession. On January 14,
1991, the Supreme Court declined to hear the case without comment.70
The Farmer case is significant not only because it is the first case to
allow an uncompromising restriction on the possession of certain firearms
by law abiding citizens,.but also because the Eleventh Circuit focused ex-
clusively on Congressional intent in its decision. Significantly, this implies
that the court either did not consider the second amendment at all or did
not consider it applicable. The court stated "we have considered Farmer's
remaining arguments and find them to be without merit."7' Perhaps it is
in this brief statement that we see the court settling the second amend-
ment issue. This is a strong indication that the views expressed by the
Supreme Court in cases such as United States v. Miller7 2 and Lewis v.
United States,7 are so well established now that lower courts no longer
feel that they must give much credence to certain second amendment ar-
guments. In denying certiorari to the case, the Supreme Court was in
essence "declining to consider arguments by the National Rifle Associa-
tion and other pro-gun advocates that the prohibition is an unconstitu-
64. Id.; see Firearms Owners Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 99-308, § 102(9), 100 Stat. 449,
452-53 (1986) (codified at 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(o) (West Supp. 1990)).
65. Farmer, 907 F.2d at 1042.
66. A Right to Machine Guns? supra note 62, at A20.
67. Farmer, 907 F.2d at 1042.
68. Id. at 1043. The United States Code at 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(o) (West Supp. 1990) states:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), it shall be unlawful for any person to trans-
fer or possess a machine gun.
(2) This subsection does not apply with respect to-
(A) a transfer to or by, or possession by or under the authority of, the United
States or any department or agency thereof or a State, or a department, agency, or
political subdivision thereof: or
(B) any lawful transfer or lawful possession of a machine gun that was lawfully
possessed before the date this subsection takes effect.
69. Farmer, 907 F.2d at 1045.
70. 111 S. Ct. 753 (1991).
71. Farmer, 907 F.2d at 1045.
72. United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
73. 445 U.S. 55 (1980).
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tional infringement on the right to keep and bear arms. ' 74 When consid-
ering the "reasonable relationship" test of Miller,7 5 it is interesting to
note that Farmer permits the prohibition of the kind of firearms that
could perhaps best serve the militia. This apparent inconsistency is un-
doubtedly an attempt by the court both to protect the existence of the
militia and to allow the legislature to put some curb on the number of
dangerous weapons available to the general public.
V. INCREASE IN CRIME AND PUBLIC CONCERN
Before considering the approach taken by Congress concerning the na-
ture of the right to bear arms, it is essential that one review pertinent
historical trends. The United States has always been a comparatively vio-
lent country. As of late, however, the number of violent crimes committed
with handguns has reached epidemic proportions.76 In 1988, the last year
for which such statistics are available, 8,915 people were murdered with
handguns in the United States.7 7 In a December 1990 New York Times
article entitled Many Cities Setting Records for Homicides in Year, it
was observed that "[gluns and drugs were cited most often as reasons for
the increases, but many law-enforcement officials and social scientists are
beginning to question something more fundamental, the value that Amer-
ican society places on life.' '7 8 In 1989, Congress recognized the connection
between guns, drugs and violent crimes and created the Antidrug, Assault
Weapons Act of 1989 ("Weapons Act"). 9 The Weapons Act was an at-
tempt to reduce the use of semiautomatic firearms by violent criminals,
particularly those involved in the drug trade.
Criminal reliance on firearms is well documented.80 However, in this
age of increasingly strict gun laws, where do they get the firearms? Unfor-
tunately, the answer to this question strikes close to home:
In one analysis, the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms found
that 96 percent of the guns used in crimes in New York City were pur-
74. Isikoff & Markus, supra note 62, at A3.
75. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178.
76. For a chart displaying the number of people murdered (and the number murdered
with firearms and handguns specifically) from 1980 to 1987 see Note, The Constitutional
Implications of Gun Control and Several Realistic Gun Control Proposals, 17 AM. J. CRIM.
LAW 19, 20 (1989).
77. King, supra note 12, § 6, at 80, col 2. The same study indicates that in 1988, seven
people were killed with handguns in Britain; nineteen in Sweden; fifty-three in Switzerland;
and eight in Canada. Id.
78. N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1990, § 1, at 41, col. 3.
79. THE ANTIDRUG, ASSAULT WEAPONS LIMITATION ACT OF 1989, S. REP. No. 160, 101st.
Cong., 1st. Sess. 6-8 (1989).
80. For a study of in-depth interviews over a three year period starting in 1982 with more




chased outside the city and almost exclusively outside the state. The same
is true in Washington, where one can buy a gun just over the line in Vir-
ginia. Virginia, Florida and Georgia form the biggest source of illegal hand-
guns in the East.81
George N. Metcalf, Assistant U.S. Attorney in Richmond explained in
1989 that "people come into a gun shop with a Virginia driver's license
and the ink is barely dry... .They buy half a dozen guns with cash, get
into a car with New York license plates, and they are gone."82 Thus, al-
though the gun laws of some states may render the purchase of guns a
difficult process there, it is an obstacle easily surmounted by a half day's
car ride to another state with less strict gun laws. Without a uniform gun
control law that applies in all states, such situations will continue to exist.
While it may be true that crimes committed with firearms are concen-
trated in urban areas, the gun problem is national in scale. With violent
crime on the rise, perhaps it is only a matter of time before all areas of
the country are "under siege." Then, a militia may truly be needed. The
predicament our country finds itself in now can hardly be what the draft-
ers of the second amendment wished, regardless of whether they intended
the right to bear arms to be of a collective or individual nature.
Not surprisingly, the grim prospect of increasing violence has led to the
formation of several groups who are intent on forcing changes in laws so
as to make it more difficult to obtain guns." These groups, as well as
private citizens, have been putting steady pressure on the legislators to
change the laws regarding gun ownership."4 In response to this pressure,
pro gun groups, such as the NRA and the Citizens Committee for the
Right to Keep and Bear Arms, have also instituted a massive lobbying
effort opposing all restrictive gun control legislation. 5
The media has also played an active role in the debate over gun con-
trol. Time magazine gave the issue a cover story6 and the debate has
been featured in the New York Times Sunday Magazine.8 7 As with all
controversial issues, the media influences the public not only with what it
chooses to publish, but with what it chooses not to publish.
81. King, supra note 12, § 6, at 82, col. 4.
82. Lacayo, Running Guns up the Interstate, TME, Feb. 6, 1989. Virginia has already
attempted to rectify that situation. See infra note 93 and accompanying text.
83. Perhaps the most influential is Handgun Control Inc., 1225 Eye Street, NW, Suite
1100, Washington, D.C. 20005.
84. "In April, 1989, an NBC/Wall Street Journal poll found that seventy-four percent of
Americans believed that the federal government should ban the sale of assault rifles in the
United States." See Note, supra note 46, at 157.
85. "Given its war chest and membership, the N.R.A. has long vied with the American
Medical Association as Washington's most powerful lobby." King, supra note 12, § 6, at 82,
col. 2.
86. Church, The Other Arms Race, TIME, Feb. 6, 1989, at 20.
87. King, supra note 12, § 6, at 43, col. 2.
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The NRA is fully aware of the power of the media and of public opin-
ion. To combat them, the NRA strongly opposes all attempts at gun con-
trol. For example in Virginia, the NRA galvanized its members into ex-
pressing their opposition to a recently proposed bill which would have'
made recently purchasing a handgun even more difficult. Virginia already
has in place a system whereby the backgrounds of all potential gun pur-
chasers are instantly checked before any sale is made.8 In 1991, however,
a bill was proposed89 that would have required a three day waiting period
before anyone could purchase a handgun in the state. This bill would
have undoubtedly significantly decreased the number of out-of-staters
who travel to Virginia for the sole purpose of purchasing handguns. For
law-abiding state residents, the requirement would have been a minor in-
convenience which would have been greatly outweighed by its positive ef-
fects. Nonetheless, Virginia members of the National Rifle Association
took out a full page advertisement in the Richmond News Leader speak-
ing against the bill. The advertisement quoted an editorial of the same
newspaper that had appeared only four days before and read: "While
waiting periods once were necessary to provide background checks, com-
puterized searches have rendered waits obsolete. . . [The 3-day waiting
period referendum (H.B.1989) is] a useless bill that has the appearance of
being tough on crime." 90 Undoubtedly, the outcry of the NRA and its
members played a significant role in the failure of the bill.91
VI. RECENT LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Congress and many state legislatures have been passing or attempting
to pass laws that would in one manner or another, restrict the use and
ownership of firearms. Granted, not all of these laws will have the same
effect or be implemented to the same degree.
Many states have implemented some form of waiting period before an
individual is permitted to purchase a firearm. For example, California
and Oregon have a 15-day waiting period while several other states have
shorter waiting periods.2 Perhaps the most modern approach is that now
practiced by the state of Virginia.
On November 1, 1989, Virginia implemented its background check sys-
tem. 3 In essence, when a person attempts to purchase a gun, the dealer
88. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2:2 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
89. H.B. 1989, Va. Gen. Ass. (1991). This billed failed in a vote of 55-42. See, Gore &
Hardy, Gun Referendum Bill Shot Down, Richmond Times-Dispatch, Feb. 5, 1991, at 5, col.
1.
90. Richmond News Leader, Feb. 1 1991 at 9.
91. See Gore & Hardy, supra note 89, at 5, col. 1.
92. Handgun Control, Inc. (Pamphlet), States With Handgun Purchase Laws (available
from Handgun Control, Inc., 1225 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 1100, Wash., D.C. 20005).
93. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-308.2:2 (Repl. Vol. 1988).
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calls the state police who then run a computerized check on the individ-
ual.94 This procedure does not require very much time and it has halted
1,475 sales of guns, or roughly 1.6 percent of the 90,655 firearms transac-
tions that were checked since the program went into effect.95 Addition-
ally, the procedure has enabled the police to capture eight prospective
buyers who were fugitives from justice, including one individual who was
wanted for murder.96 As mentioned, Virginia attempted to supplement
this already effective program with an additional three-day waiting pe-
riod.9 7 Although the three-day waiting period was rejected, the attempts
of Virginians to strengthen their gun laws is one example of how the sepa-
rate states are recognizing the menacing problem that easy access to guns
creates and how they are attempting to prevent "blood running in the
streets like some Third World capital."9 " The present Virginia system,
although not perfect,99 was approved with the backing of both gun control
advocates and the NRA and became a focus of the debate in Congress
over federal handgun legislation. 100
There has been considerable activity on a national level as well. There
have been many attempts to ban or put restrictions on particular types of
weapons, usually automatic or semi-automatic weapons. The Firearms
Owners' Protection Act of 1986,101 which was in dispute in the Farmer v.
Higgins102 case, is an example of such an attempt. In effect, the Act pro-
hibits the making and manufacture of new machine guns for possession
by private persons.' 03 The United States Court of Appeals for the Elev-
enth Circuit found that the Act does properly prohibit the manufacture
and ownership of such weapons.
0 4
The Restricted Weapons Act of 1990105 is another example of how Con-
gress is attempting to control the situation. This Act was submitted to
94. Id.
95. N.Y. Times National, May 5, 1991, at 29, col. 1.
96. Handgun Control, Inc. (Pamphlet), Brady Bill Will Catch Felons (available from
Handgun Control, Inc., 1225 Eye Street, N.W., Suite 1100, Wash., D.C. 20005).
97. See H.B. 1989, Va. Gen. Ass. (1991).
98. Senator Warren Rudman (R-N.H.) suggested that this would be the case in Washing-
ton D.C. unless there was a federal takeover of the city's police department. Lock and Load
for the Gunfight of '89, supra note 4, at 9.
99. Potential buyers in Virginia are required to present two forms of identification. How-
ever, as the buyer is checked against state and federal records, if the buyer gives false infor-
mation, there is nothing state officials can do. Also, for offenses committed out of state,
Virginia must rely on files maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. These records
are considered of "dubious quality." See N.Y. Times National, May 5, 1991, at 29, col. 1.
100. Id.
101. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(o) (West Supp. 1990).
102. 907 F.2d 1041 (11th Cir. 1990).
103. 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(o) (West Supp. 1990).
104. Farmer, 907 F.2d at 1045.
105. H.R. 4225, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 101-621 (1990).
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the Committee on the Judiciary to amend title 18 of the United States
Code. 10 6 In essence, the Act would greatly restrict the use and ownership
of "restricted weapons" such as semi-automatic rifles which have no legit-
imate connection to sport.
10 7
Perhaps the most widely known gun control bill is the Brady Bill, 08
which has been around since 1987 and has received considerable attention
from both the media and the pro-gun lobby. The bill, which was named
for Jim Brady, the White House press secretary struck in the head with
an exploding bullet during John Hinckley's attempted assassination of
President Reagan, establishes a national seven-day waiting period for the
purchase of handguns.'09 This period will allow local law enforcement to
conduct background checks on all handgun purchasers who purchase
from licensed dealers. Within one day of the proposed transfer, the dealer
would be required to provide a copy of the purchaser's sworn statement
to the chief law enforcement officer where the purchaser resides. The
sworn statement, which must be verified by some form of picture identifi-
cation, will include all relevant information on the purchaser. If the
dealer does not get a negative response, the sale may go through at the
end of the seven days. If an individual requires access to a handgun be-
cause of a threat to his or her life or the life of a member of his or her
household, local law enforcement may waive the seven-day waiting pe-
riod.1 0 In reference to the Brady Bill, former President Ronald Reagan
remarked that "it's just plain common sense that there be a waiting pe-
riod to allow local law-enforcement officials to conduct background checks
on those who wish to purchase handguns.""'
In 1988, Rep. William McCollum proposed an amendment to the Brady
Bill." ' The amendment would substitute a national "instant" check sys-
tem for the Brady Bill's seven-day waiting period."13 Although this
amendment was rejected by the House Judiciary Committee, it was ulti-
106. The United States Code at 18 U.S.C. § 922 (b)(4) (1988) in particular deals with
unlawful acts concerning restricted firearms. Private citizens in the United States cannot
purchase any of these assault weapons because they are capable of fully automatic fire.
Weapons capable of fully automatic machine gun fire have been regulated heavily in the
United States since 1934 and private sale or possession of these weapons has been com-
pletely banned since May, 1986. See 18 U.S.C. 922(o) (1998).
107. There are often problems in defining which weapons fit into which category. For a
good discussion of the definition problem as it affects "assault weapons," see Note, supra
note 46.
108. S. 1236, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
109. Id. at § 2(a).
110. Id.
111. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1991, at Al, col. 1.
112. Handgun Control, Inc. (Pamphlet), Summary of New McCollum Substitute (availa-





mately enacted in place of the Brady Bill.
On November 21, 1989, Jim Brady testified before a Senate judiciary
subcommittee on behalf of the Brady Bill."4 On July 24, 1990, the House
Judiciary Committee ordered the Brady Bill favorably reported by a vote
of twenty-seven to nine.1 15 At this time, Rep. McCollum proposed another
amendment that, although it was rejected, is expected to resurface when
the Brady Bill is again considered." 6 In late October, the Brady Bill was
bottled up in the House of Representatives and never reached the floor.
The new McCollum substitute has three sections." 7 First, by October 1,
1992, licensed firearm dealers in all fifty states must have in full opera-
tion place of purchase telephone check systems for all firearm purchases,
or the states will lose their federal justice assistance funding."18 An alter-
native but adequate system already in place will satisfy the amendment.
Second, by October 1, 1996, all states must require drivers' licenses to
contain a fingerprint of the licensee or they will lose their federal justice
assistance funding." 9 Dealers would then use the fingerprints to do back-
ground checks. If a dealer failed to do so, he would forfeit his federal
firearms license. Third, beginning October 1, 1991, states would be re-
quired to spend 5% of their federal justice assistance funds to computer-
ize and update their criminal justice records."0O
A more significant substitute for the Brady Bill was proposed by Rep-
resentative Harley D. Staggers, Jr., a Democrat from West Virginia. 2 '
Opponents of the Brady Bill have embraced Staggers' proposal and look
to the Virginia system as an example of how a nationwide system of back-
ground checks would function. In essence, Staggers would like to establish
a national information center which would do computer checks of crimi-
nal records maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
22
On May 8, 1991, the Brady Bill passed the House of Representa-
tives.1 23 The Bill will then go to the Senate where its future is uncertain.
However President Bush "has said that he would veto any gun-control
measure that is not part of a comprehensive anti-crime legislation that
stiffens criminal penalties."'124 Thus, if either the Brady Bill or a substi-
114. N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1990 (Magazine) at 45.






121. N.Y. Times National, May 5, 1991, at 29.
122. Id.
123. N.Y. Times, May 9, 1991, at Al, col. 1. "The 239-to 186 vote came after four hours of
intense, sometimes emotional debate during which supporters of the waiting period por-
trayed the vote as a major repudiation of the National Rifle Association .... Id.
124. Id.
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tute is approved by the Senate, and not vetoed by the President, some
drastic changes will be taking place in the manner in which firearms are
bought and sold in the United States. The Supreme Court's virtual si-
lence on the issue seems to be an indication to both the federal and the
state governments that reasonable restrictions placed on the purchase
and ownership of firearms do not violate the second amendment.
VII. CONCLUSION
It is unlikely that either the violence in the streets or the struggle in
the courts over the right to bear arms will end anytime soon. However,
the public, the media, and the law-makers are becoming increasingly
aware of the problem. As both the Congress and the state legislatures
take measures to limit the availability of firearms, the courts are allowing
these limitations to take effect. As the "collective rights" idea moves from
theory to practice, there will hopefully be a change in the way Americans
view violent crime.
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